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１．Foreword
Many Japanese politicians and government officials seem to be haunted by the
memories of the 1991 Gulf War, in which Japan contributed as much as 13 billion dollars
to the U.S.-led Multinational Coalition Forces’war efforts against Iraq, which invaded
the oil-rich Kuwait about six months before, but met with little appreciation. Some
Western papers even went as far as to say that Japan avoided letting blood and sweat by
donating the huge sum. 
So right after the deadly terrorist attack on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, the
Japanese Government, led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, went all-out to work
out ways to fully cooperate with the United States through military and other means in its
fight against the Al-Qaeda terrorist group without overstepping the bounds of Japan’s
prized no-war Constitution. In the end, the government and the ruling three-party
coalition succeeded in getting the anti-terrorism bill through the Diet（parliament）in
late October. The law enabled the dispatch of three ships of Japan’s Maritime Self-
Defense Force（MSDF）to the Indian Ocean in late November for logistical support of
the U.S. forces conducting military operations in Afghanistan. This represented the first
overseas dispatch in war times of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
This paper attempts to analyze how the leading Japanese and U.S. newspapers reported
on the Japanese Government’s response to Sept. 11 in terms of volume and angles,
especially circumstances leading up to the enactment of the bill and the dispatch of SDF
ships to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S. forces. 
As the target for analysis, this thesis has chosen the New York Times（NYT）and the
Wall Street Journal（WSJ）and the Washington Post from the United States and the
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English editions of the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun as well as the Japan
Times in Japan. Comparisons will be made between the three U.S. and as many Japanese
newspapers as well as between the three newspapers in each country. The period covered
was between Sept. 12 and Dec. 31 in 2001.
The criteria for the choice of the three U.S. newspapers was that they are virtually
playing the role of opinion leaders in the United States. We have avoided local newspapers.
The same goes for the choice of the three Japanese English-language newspapers.
２．Three Reporting Models
On the basis of the comparison of the three U.S. newspapers and as many Japanese
newspapers regarding the topic of Tokyo’s response after Sept. 11 in the U.S. and
Japanese journalism, we have proposed a hypothetical model-building method and
discerned three models of reporting on the topic.１）
They are the“Japan should be cautious”model, the“Japan should act promptly”
model and the“Japan is irrelevant”model. The yardstick for classifying stories into the
three models mainly rests on the perception of the need for Japan’s cooperation with the
United States in the latter’s fight against terrorism and the attitude toward the anti-
terrorism bill, which paved the way for the dispatch of the Japanese SDF troops to the
Indian Ocean. 
The followings is the numerical breakdown of major stories on Tokyo’s response after
Sept. 11 as carried in the three Japanese English-language newspapers and collected by
the author（editorials include analysis and commentary articles）:
We shall heretofore explain about each of the three models.
Asahi




33 straight stories 14 straight stories
Yomiuri Japan Times
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２．１ “Japan should be cautious”model of reporting
The newspaper that belongs to this category is the Asahi Shimbun.２）The Asahi
Shimbun extensively covered the Japanese Government’s response to Sept. 11.
The paper began airing cautious views on how Japan should respond to Sept. 11 with
the editorials２）on Sept. 15 and Sept. 19. In the former editorial titled“Japan should not
recklessly support U.S. military reprisals,”the paper said.
Japan should not allow itself to be driven into reckless support of U.S. military actions
by its sense of obligation to do something to help its most important ally. The unenviable
task of Japan as a friend is to try to make the U.S. realize the folly of revenge.
Then the government proposed the anti-terrorism law３）. In a lengthy editorial titled
“What Japan needs to do to cooperate in U.S. retaliation”on Sept. 21, the Asahi
Shimbun said:
The bill for the new legislation should be examined from many angles, for example, the
extent of logistical support, conditions for withdrawal and the requirement for Diet
approval to dispatch SDF forces. Although it is important to be able to promptly respond
to changing situations, a slapdash approach will backfire.
But the parliamentary debate was not as heated as initially expected partly because the
main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, was not totally opposed to the bill.
The anti-terrorism law passed the Diet on Oct. 29. The new law could send Japanese
soldiers, sailors and airmen overseas during active hostilities for the first time since
World War II. The law, hurried through the Diet following the devastating attacks on
New York and Washington, allows the Self-Defense Forces to provide rear-echelon
support to the U.S.-led battle against terrorism. In sharp contrast to the glacial pace
usually exhibited by lawmakers, the law’s progress was swift after submission to the Diet
on Oct. 5. Diet deliberations on the bill lasted only about 60 hours. It should be noted that
the government and the ruling coalition have repeatedly stressed the importance of swift
passage, fearing that U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan might be over by the time the
bill cleared the Diet.
Three Maritime Self-Defense Force（MSDF）vessels, on a mission to carry supplies
for U.S. ships and aid for refugees, left their respective ports on Nov. 25 for the Indian
Ocean to support the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism and bring aid for
Afghan refugees.４）
In the debate over the decision to dispatch Self-Defense Forces logistical support for
the U.S.-led military campaign against terrorism, the principle of civilian control seemed
to have not gotten enogh attention.
The mood of the political world and the general public has apparently changed from the
time of the Gulf War when there was a livelier debate on the advisability of sending SDF
troops to combat zones within the bounds of the present no-war Constitution. It seems
that the Asahi Shimbun’s apparent efforts to incite lively debate on the matter did not
bear fruit this time around.
２．２ “Japan Should act promptly”model
The“Japan should act promptly”model of reporting was conspicuous in stories
carried by the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Japan Times. They were characterized by an
emphasis on the need to cooperate sufficiently and swiftly with the United States in its
fight against terrorism.
The Yomiuri Shimbun, whose articles are translated into English in the Daily Yomiuri,５）
extensively covered Tokyo’s response t o Sept. 11, as in the case of the Asahi Shimbun.
The Yomiuri Shimbun’s Sept. 27 editorial titled“Japan must fight terror resolutely”
explained that Prime Minister Koizumi and U.S. President George W. Bush agreed in
their summit meeting to work together to counter international terrorism resolutely. It
also said:
Now that Japan has vowed to the international community that it will join the united
front to fight against terrorism, it must act promptly, not only in extending logistic
support to U.S. military campaigns, but also in a range of other fields, including
diplomacy and the economy.
The paper’s Sept. 27 editorial titled“Diet session forum for twin crises”urged haste
in parliamentary debate on the anti-terrorism bill. It said:
U.S. military action is increasingly seen as imminent. Japan cannot afford to waste
time. Passage of legislation to enable SDF logistic support must be the first order of
business in the extraordinary Diet session.
In this instance, a complete overhaul of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau’s narrow-
minded interpretation of the Constitution-which has strictly limited the SDF’s activities
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overseas-is essential. The current interpretation does“not allow the SDF to conduct
activities linked to the use of force.”
Japan cannot waste time repeating unrealistic defense debates based on past
developments. Both the ruling and opposition parties are urged to face reality squarely
and conduct constructive debate on how to bring about effective results of SDF’s
overseas dispatches.
So the watchword was“haste”or“waste no time”for the Yomiuri Shimbun.
Meanwhile, the paper’s Oct. 7 issue carried an article titled“The Yomiuri’s eight
proposals”and four of them were related to Tokyo’s response to Sept. 11. They are:
１ Learn a lesson from the Gulf War
--Expedite the passage of the anti-terrorism bill
--Do not shackle the SDF with unnecessary restraints
２ Do away with‘one-country pacifism’
--Forget pursuing party interests while discussing national security
--Create a strong society to fight terrorism
３ Establish a system to defend against terrorism
--Give the SDF the right to patrol and guard key facilities within Japan’s territory
--Reinforce the intelligence function of the Cabinet
４ Approve the use of collective self-defense
--Prime Minister Koizumi should push for a reinterpretation of the Constitution
These are clearly defined views of the Yomiuri Shimbun and are typical of orthodox
conservative opinions in Japan.
The bill passed the Diet on Oct. 29. But the Yomiuri Shimbun did not think it went far
enough. In its Nov. 18 article titled“SDF’s 1st wartime mission narrow in scope”said:
The SDF’s logistic support（enabled by the bill）is limited to specific fields such as
transportation of supplies. In addition, areas where the SDF can offer support, the content
of the support and the use of weapons by SDF personnel are all strictly limited.
Restrictions also are imposed on SDF personnel’s use of weapons.
The paper then summed up its pessimism by saying:
It cannot be denied that the SDF will be less active than the forces of the United States,
Britain and other allies that have deployed combat forces, or those North Atlantic Treaty




So the Yomiuri Shimbun was dissatisfied with the parliamentary debate on the anti-
terrorism law for a reason different from the Asahi Shimbun.
The Japan Times was aware of the criticism leveled against Prime Minister Koizumi
for his hastiness, but nevertheless threw its support behind him. It said in the editorial:
Critics argues he is moving too fast-that he is trying to“catch up”with leaders of
other U.S. allies who have responded quickly to the terrorist strikes, and that he is afraid
of repeating the blunder Tokyo made at the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Never
mind. The prime minister is moving in the right direction.
But the Japan Times was not as clear-cut on the issue of Japan’s right to collective self-
defense, which, if permitted, is feared to violate the no-war Japanese constitution,
compared with the Yomiuri Shimbun and calls for avoiding the debate on the issue. In the
same editorials, the Japan Times said:
Hardliners may be tempted to use the debate（on the bill）as an opportunity to alter
the constitutional framework itself. But the debate should not be put in focus.
Extending to potentially explosive issues-such as changing the government’s
interpretation of the right to collective self-defense（the Constitution prohibits the nation
from exercising this right）and the unilateral nature of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
（the nation cannot militarily defend the U.S.）would create unnecessary confusion.
Right after the passage of the bill, the Japan Times carried an editorial on Oct. 31,
2001, titled“Beyond the antiterror bill”which was, we believe, was marked by cool-
headedness on two points. One of them was that it pointed out the need to care about
reaction from abroad, particularly Asian countries, concerning Japan’s dispatch of SDF
troops, and the other is the distinction between combat and noncombat areas, it said:
Every SDF move will be watched closely not only by the Japanese people but also by
the nations around the world, including our Asian neighbors and Islamic states. ...It is
unclear how the military operations in Afghanistan will develop in coming weeks and
months. This makes it hard to determine exactly where they will provide logistic and
other noncombat support. Fighting elusive terrorist forces could make it impossible to
draw a line between combat and noncombat areas.
So we can say there were some subtle differences in stories carried by the newspapers
which we have categorized into the“Japan should act promptly”model.
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２．３ “Japan is irrelevant”model of reporting
All the three U.S. newspapers, which we have examined, seem to have virtually
ignored what was being debated and what the Japanese government was going to do in
the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The three newspapers,
the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post seemed to have
been too occupied with reporting on what the U.S. government was going to do, the
aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, what moves Al-Qaeda terrorists
might make, the situation in Afghanistan, and other matters which they apparently
thought were more important.
In particular, we could not find articles on moves surrounding the enactment of the
Japanese antiterror bill in the Washington Post.
２．３．１　NYT had only 3 major stories
As the largest of the terror attacks on Sept. 11 occurred in New York, destroying the
World Trade Center buildings, the NYT carried lots of stories, long and short, everyday.
It created a special section to report on the aftermath of the terrorist attacks as well as the
United States’battle against Al-Qaeda terrorist group. It comprised several pages every
day. We leafed through the voluminous NYT Sept. 12 through Dec. 31 in 2001, but we
found only three major stories referring to Tokyo’s response and related matters. It was
small in percentage wise. Moreover, the author of the three articles were apparently
unimpressed by what Tokyo was going to do.
The following is the first article after Sept. 12 and was entitled“Japanese Leader,
Visiting China, Is Mildly Rebuked on Army Role.”It says:
China’s leaders warned Japan today to remember the wariness of other Asian countires”
as it considers sending military forces to play a supporting role in the war on terrorism,
but the friendly tone with which the message was delievered reflected a thawing of ties
that have been badly strained in recent months.
In a meeting with the visiting Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, President
Jiang Zemin said it was“easy to understand”why Japan wants to be involved in the
American-led campaign, a Japanese official said. China’s mild response suggested that it
has tacitly accepted Japan’s plan for a modest loosening of postwar restriction on
sending military forces abroad.
Mr. Koizumi’s governing coalition has proposed bills to allow Japan’s Self-Defense
Forcess to provide rear-area logistical support for the military attacks on Afghanistan and to
help guard American military sites in Japan. Critics say those steps will blur the country’s
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constitutional bar on the use of force abroad.（Erik Eckholm, 2001, October 9）
It is clear from this article that the NYT was not necessarily in favor of Japan’s
untrammeled military support for the U.S. forces and that it was well aware of the
concerns of China and other Asian countries about the so-called“revival of militarism.”
There was a big gap between the cursory references to Japan’s contribution to
nonmilitary matters in the U.S. fight against terrorism and intensive reporting on the
matter by the Japanese media day after day at that time.
The following story is a kind of a nasty one for the Japanese as it relates Sept. 11 to the
Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor. It said:
Mr. Bush drew strong comparison between the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon and the surprise raid by nearly 200 Japanese war planes on Pearl
Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.（Elizabeth Bumiller, 2001, December 8）
But nevertheless the paper pointed to Mr. Bush’s consideration about the feelings of
the Japanese by saying:
Mr. Bush was careful to note that Japan, the enemy in the Pearl Harbor attack, was now
one of“America’s finest friends.”He added that“today, our two nations are working
side by side in the fight against terror.”
The NYT was not keenly interested in Japan’s response to Sept. 11.
２．３．２　WSJ’s balanced reporting
We could observe that the degree of the perception that“Japan was irrelevant”was
lower in the case of the Wall Street Journal.      
Like the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal did not run many stories on the
Japanese response to Sept. 11. We have counted five. But what differentiates the WSJ
from the NYT was the fact that the former reported on the subject at important junctures,
that is when Prime Minister Koizumi announced the seven steps to cooperate with the
U.S. fight against terrorism and when the Japanese parliament approved the anti-
terrorism bill. The first story was titled“Tokyo Hastens to Assure U.S. of Its Aid in Any
Way.”It first focused on Koizumi’s remarks.
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Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, moving quickly to avoid the embarrassment that
Japan suffered in the Gulf War a decade ago, said Tokyo is ready to send troops to
transport goods and give medical aid if the U.S. goes to war against terrorism.
Mr. Koizumi’s announcement reflects a growing sentiment that Japan shouldn’t allow
a repeat of the Gulf War, when it was criticized for failing to send troops in support of
the multinational army that drove Iraq out of Kuwait. Japan did contribute $13 billion in
the Gulf War effort, but only after heavy pressure from the U.S.（Peter Landers,
September 30, 2001）.
It then forecast that“the move might have lasting geopolitical significance that goes
well beyond today’s fight against terrorism”and that it“could pave the way for a larger
Japanese role in international power politics.”We can note that the article is well-
balanced in that it referred to the likelihood that the move may“ignite controversy
among a populace with strong pacifist leanings.”
It went on to say that a fierce debate is likely in parliament. The writer of this article,
Mr. Peter Landers, was well informed about the situation in Japan.
The second story was published on Oct. 30 and was titled“Japan’s Parliament
Approves Use of Troops to Help Fight Terrorism.”The first and second paragraphs were
like this:
Japanese warships could be steaming toward the Indian Ocean as early as mid-
November , after parliament gave final approval to legislation that allows Japan’s
military to go overseas in the fight against terrorism.
The dispatch of troops will be an unprecedented experiment for modern Japan, whose
military has been held back by constitutional restrictions and fear of alarming Asian
neighbors who were involved by Japan in the 1930s.（Peter Landers, October 30, 2001
The article also pointed to a critical view of the new law among the Japanese by
quoting some critics as saying that“Japan will effectively be sucked into war even if it
tries to limit itself to logistical support.”
It should be also noted that both the NYT and the WSJ were concerned about the
possibility that the dispatch of Japanese SDF troops to an overseas combat zone may lead
to the revival of militarism in Japan. Such an argument was rarely seen in Japanese
English-language newspapers.
３．Conclusion
The war in Afghanistan ended quickly. It is said that in Afghanistan, the U.S. forces
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were in charge of about 97％ of the operations and the rest was taken by British troops
with some Japanese SDF ships showing only an insignificant presence by hovering
around the margins of the nearby waters in the Indian Ocean. So the brouhaha in the
Japanese Diet may have been only a storm in a teacup. But similar“storms”occurred in
many Western European nations, including France and Germany. Without going into
detail, it appears that the unilateralism, or virtually unilateral military action on the part
of the United States in Afghanistan, seemed to be m.aking these countries uneasy. 
Now let us cite some conclusions.
First, there was no small gap both in terms of the degree of interest and volume of
reporting between the English-language press in Japan and the leading U.S. papers, with
the former running a great number of stories, long and short, on Tokyo’s response to
Sept. 11. The latter’s interest was limited partly because of the fact that what was being
debated in Japan about measures to fight international terrorism would not matter much
in the global context.
The New York Times virtually ignored Tokyo’s response to Sept. 11. It is understandable
that the paper based in one of the cities attacked by the terrorists apparently could not
afford to take interest in such a marginal topic. The Wall Street Journal was more
interested in what was being debated in Japan after Sept. 11 but did only a minimal
amount of reporting. So in short, it would not be far-fetched to say that Japan was
“irrelevant”for them as far as the United States’fight against terrorists was concerned.
It should be also noted that neither the NYT nor the WSJ aired expectations even about
the Japanese SDF’s logistical support to the U.S. military in the latter’s fight against
terrorism. Rather they were wary about a possible revival of militarism in Japan. Such a
harsh view on the part of the leading U.S. newspapers seems to have been overlooked
both by the government and the media in Japan.
All the three Japanese English-language newspapers taken up in this thesis-the English
versions of the Asahi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun as well as the Japan Times-
avidly reported on Tokyo’s response to Sept. 11, particularly the debate on the anti-
terrorism bill. But they did it from entirely different angles. The Asah Shibun urged
caution, while the Yomiuri Shimbun called for quick deliberations on the bill so as not to
give the impression to the outside world that Japan is divided on the need to take
counterterrorism measures. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that many essential questions remain unanswered. For
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example, the Asahi Shimbun’s call for civilian control and the Yomiuri Shimbun’s
insistence on the need to reinterprete the Constitution by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau,
in particular as regards the right to collective self-defense, are expected to be the focus of
attention again, if the United States stages a major military campaign against Iraq and
calls for Tokyo’s support.
１） In proposing a model-building method and carrying out a model-discernment work, the following
book was very useful, particularly the secion on“reporting principle”:
Mencher, Melvin, News Reporting and Writing, Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, Dubuque,
Iowa, 1977
２） Editorials in English of the Asahi Shimbun usually appear one or two days after the Japanese
version. In most cases, editorials in the Japanese language are directly translated into those in
English. The same goes for the Yomiuri Shimbun.
３） The Asahi Shimbun used the expression“anti-terrorism”, while the Yomiuri Shimbun adopted the
“antiterrorism.”
４） Besides sending six MSDF ships for rear-echelon support, Japan provided air transportation by
using six C-130 transport planes and other SDF aircraft linking U.S. bases in Japan with those in
Guam, Singapore and elsewhere.
５） Yomiuri Shimbun articles, including editorials, were taken from the Yomirui Shimbun online data
service.
References
9-11, Noam Chomsky, Seven Stories Press, 2002
Terrorism and War, Howard Zinn, Seven Stories Press, 2002
Jiji Newsword 2002, Jiji Press, 2002
Chiezo, Asahi Shimbun, 2002
